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alternatives are (i) non-naturalist realism, (ii) reductive nat-
uralism, and (iii) different varieties of expressivism.1 Con-
tractualism is often understood as an ethical theory, but 
sometimes it has also been seen as a metaethical position 
called ‘constructivism’ (Southwood 2009, p. 926).2 I aim to 
show that contractualism can be used to formulate a new 
metaethical position only in a restricted sense.3 Contractu-
alist theories must rely on practical reasons and construc-
tivism about them fails. Yet, if we accept a non-construc-
tivist view of reasons, we can use these reasons and 
contractualism to create a new restricted constructivist 
metaethical position about right and wrong.
Section  2 outlines realism and reductivism as broad 
worldviews. Section  3 then creates a third constructiv-
ist alternative based on Crispin Wright’s epistemic notion 
of truth. Section 4 explains the difference between global 
and restricted versions of constructivism. Sections 5 and 6 
outline an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue 
against constructivism about reasons. Sections 7, 8, 9, and 
10 finally sketch how contractualists can use unconstructed 
reasons to create a new restricted constructivist metaethical 
view.
1 For (i), see Enoch (2011) and Shafer-Landau (2003); for (ii), see 
Schroeder (2007) and Smith (1994); and (iii) see Blackburn (1998) 
and Gibbard (2003).
2 For the contractualists’ and constructivists’ metaethical stances, 
see Bagnoli (2011). For an attempt to formulate the view as a distinct 
metaethical view, see Korsgaard (2008). For an objection, see Hus-
sain and Shah (2006) and James (2012).
3 I borrow the distinction between restricted and thoroughgoing 
forms of constructivism from Street (2008, pp. 208–209). For a dif-
ferent argument to this conclusion, see Scanlon (2012, pp. 236–241).
Abstract Metaethics is often dominated by both realist 
views according to which moral claims are made true by 
either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cogni-
tivist views according to which these claims express desire-
like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism 
is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how 
it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this 
article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on 
Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumen-
tative strategy that can be used to argue against construc-
tivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article 
explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical frame-
work, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can 
still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructiv-
ist position about right and wrong.
Keywords Contractualism · Constructivism · Practical 
reasons · Right and wrong · Metaethics
1 Introduction
Metaethical theories attempt to understand the nature of 
moral properties, language, and judgments. The three main 
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2  Realism and Reductivism
According to Extreme Realism, the world consists of inde-
pendently existing layers of reality. At the bottom-level, 
there are space–time points, basic physical particles, and 
their properties. In virtue of this layer, there are atoms and 
molecules; in virtue of them, biological organisms; in vir-
tue of them, economic, political and social systems, and 
evaluative and moral facts; and so on.
Here the ‘in virtue of’ locution describes a ground-
ing relation between two independent levels of existence. 
Imagine that God is creating a world and stops at level n. 
According to Extreme Realists, at this point the world does 
not contain the objects and properties of the level n + 1: if 
God stops at the biological level, the world does not yet 
contain moral properties. In order to get those properties, 
God has to create again. Extreme Realism is thus maxi-
mally ontologically committed: it posits many indepen-
dently existing layers of reality.
According to Austere Reductivism in contrast, the most 
fundamental natural science—physics—captures every-
thing that exists. In explaining everything that takes place, 
physicists only posit the existence of space–time points, 
their material occupants instantiating arrangements of 
localised intrinsic properties, and the external space–time 
relations between them. Austere Reductivists then claim 
that all truths are about those objects, properties, and rela-
tions. Take any simple true sentence of the form ‘X is F’ 
where ‘X’ is a name of an object and ‘is F’ a predicate 
which picks out a property such as feeling pain, being a cat, 
or the like. On this view, these true sentences can always be 
translated into true sentences about the space–time points, 
their material occupants and their properties, and the rela-
tions between them. The different ways of arranging the 
previous objects, properties and relations create a space of 
possibilities of how the world could be. Any sentence of 
the form ‘X is F’ is then taken to divide the space of pos-
sibilities to conditions under which the sentence is true and 
to ones in which it isn’t (Lewis 1970, Sect. 3).
In this framework, any truth of the form ‘X is F’ can be 
captured by sentences which only describes the basic parti-
cles, their properties, and the relations between them (Jack-
son 1994, pp. 31–32), because the latter sentences divide 
up the space of possibilities in the very same way as the 
original sentence. According to Austere Reductivism, there 
are thus no truths about our world that cannot be accounted 
for in terms of differences and similarities among patterns 
of localised particles and their properties.
3  Constructivism
Constructivism is located somewhere between metaphysi-
cally committed realism and metaphysically parsimonious 
reductivism (Lenman 2010, p. 178; Timmons 2004, p. 93). 
How could there be room for such a view? This section 
describes Wright’s (1992) answer to this question.
According to the previous views, true sentences corre-
spond to wordly facts that make them true. These positions 
only disagree about the nature of the truth-making facts. 
According to the Extreme Realists, these facts consist of 
sui generis objects and properties, whereas, according to 
the Austere Reductivists, they consist of the space–time 
points, the basic particles, and their properties.4
In order to formulate a third alternative, we must give up 
the correspondence theory of truth (Dorsey 2012, pp. 
100–108) and adopt instead an epistemic conception of 
truth.5 In any area of discourse, there are epistemic norms 
that describe when a speaker is warranted to assert its sen-
tences. They can be used to define a property of sentences 
called ‘superassertibility’: a sentence is superassertible if 
and only if there is an accessible state of information which 
would justify asserting that sentence and continue to do so 
no matter how much more humanly possible investigation 
were done in the future (Wright 1992, pp. 44–48).6
At least in some discourses, superassertible sentences 
have all platitudinous features of true sentences. The sen-
tence ‘X is F’ is true if and only if X is F, truth is a timeless 
property of sentences, truth doesn’t come in degrees, and a 
sentence is true only if it corresponds to facts. Wright has 
shown that, in some discourses, the superassertibility prop-
erty of sentences satisfies these same platitudes: ‘X is F’ is 
superassertible if and only if X is F, superassertibility is a 
timeless property of sentences, it doesn’t come in degrees, 
and the superassertible sentences correspond to the relevant 
4 According to some non-reductive views, base-level properties can 
be truth-makers for the higher-order claims, because the base-level 
properties in each case realize the higher-order properties (Shafer-
Landau 2003, pp. 72–73; Wedgwood 2007, Ch. 9).
5 Dorsey prefers coherentism about truth, but such views are vulner-
able to Russell’s Bishop Stubbs objection (Hussain 2012). Because 
many constructivists have not steered clear from the correspondence 
theories, their views are easier to understand as versions of reductiv-
ism (Street 2008, p. 223, 2012, p. 40; Ridge 2012). I call the outlined 
view constructivist because the facts of a given domain are on this 
view constructed out of the satisfaction of the relevant epistemic 
norms.
6 Superassertibility thus contains the normative property of justified 
assertion that can be understood in terms of having good epistemic 
reasons for the assertion in question. I have argued elsewhere that 
this normativity cannot be understood in a constructivist way as this 
would lead to an infinite regress (Suikkanen 2016).
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facts when the latter is understood in a deflationist way 
(Wright 1992, pp. 44–61).
Given that superassertibility is an epistemic property of 
sentences, it is the most minimal property of sentences, 
which satisfies the previous truth-platitudes. We can thus 
assume that at least in some discourses nothing further is 
required for truth than superassertibility (Wright 1992, pp. 
71–78). The previous platitudes specify a role which truth 
plays in a discourse and so if superassertibility satisfies 
these platitudes in a discourse we can assume that it real-
izes the role of truth in that discourse.7 Until we have good 
reasons to believe that truth in a discourse consists of more 
robust correspondence, we are entitled to believe that in 
that discourse truth is realized by superassertibility. Wright 
has also helpfully outlined the ways in which realists about 
a given domain can argue that the property of truth is real-
ized by some more robust property in that domain (Wright 
1992, Chs. 3–5).
If being true is realized by superassertibility in a dis-
course, then the superassertible sentences of that discourse 
are its true sentences. So, if the truth of colour-sentences is 
realized by their superassertibility, then the superassertibil-
ity of the sentence ‘X is red’ entails that it is true that X is 
red, which also entails that X really is red. Furthermore, if 
we can talk about fact and properties in a deflationist way, 
then the superassertibility of the original sentence in addi-
tion entails that it is a fact that X is red and that X has the 
property of being red (Wright 1992, pp. 24–27).
Constructivism about colour thus means that redness is a 
projection from the relevant superassertible sentences. This 
view is a third, ‘constructivist’ alternative. It is not a realist 
view because it does not assume ontologically heavyweight 
sui generis colour facts and properties. The view isn’t a 
form of reductivism either. You have warrant for assert-
ing that an object is red on the basis of some information 
specified by the epistemic norms of the colour discourse. 
For example, perhaps you have warrant for claiming that 
an object is red when you know that normal observers are 
disposed to call it ‘red’ in broad daylight. Yet, even if this 
information warrants your statement, it is about a quality 
of the object—its redness—rather than about the relevant 
dispositions of the normal observers.
4  Global and Restricted Constructivism
Global constructivism claims that superassertibility realizes 
the truth of all true sentences (Wright 1996, Sect. 2). If you 
7 Following Lynch (2009), I understand truth as a functional property 
specified by the truth-truisms, and superassertibility and correspond-
ence as its realizers.
are a constructivist about some property F, then you must 
specify what information makes the sentences about Fness 
superassertible. If you are a global constructivist, then, for 
every property, you have to find what further information 
makes the sentences about that property superassertible.
This view might be thought to lead to a vicious regress. 
One would need to find more and more new information 
that makes the sentences of the previous domains superas-
sertible. Such a regress could, however, be avoided if all 
discourses formed a large interrelated network. Yet, even if 
such networks avoid the problem, there are still discourses 
that are difficult to understand in the constructivist way. 
They include, for example, discourses about basic particles, 
ordinary objects, phenomenal experiences, and semantic 
properties.
This suggests that we should be constructivists only in 
certain domains. On this view, truth in some domains is 
realized by robust correspondence whereas in others it is 
realized by superassertibility. This view then claims that the 
information about the former truths makes the sentences of 
the latter discourses superassertible. People who accept this 
position are realists about the basic truths and constructiv-
ists about the truths in the other domains. Where should 
we then draw the line between the basic and constructed 
truths? One natural suggestion is that we should draw it 
between ‘the natural domain’ and ‘the normative domain’ 
(Dorsey 2012, p. 109).
We should thus be realists about all the domains that 
can be investigated scientifically. This natural domain 
can be taken to include the basic particles and the laws of 
nature, atoms and molecules, biological systems, social, 
economic, and political systems, and psychological proper-
ties. According to this proposal, the natural domain doesn’t 
contain any normative properties, but information about 
it makes normative sentences superassertible. Restricted 
constructivist could then argue that the truth of the latter 
sentences is realized by their superassertibility, and that the 
normative properties are thus projections from minimally 
true sentences. This constructivist metaethical position is 
not a form of realism, reductivism, or expressivism. Nor-
mative facts would not have distinct, independent existence, 
nor would they be reducible to natural facts either given 
that the information about the natural facts only makes the 
normative sentences superassertible.
5  Constructivism About Reasons
Sentences of the type ‘that X is F is a reason for A to φ in 
C’ are paradigmatic sentences of the practical reasons dis-
course. They specify what is the reason, what that reason is 
a reason for, for whom it is a reason, and the circumstances 
in which the reason-relation holds. Constructivism about 
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practical reasons claims that the truth of these sentences is 
realized by their superassertibility.
Such proposals need to identify the information that 
makes sentences about reasons superassertible. Construc-
tivists emphasise the importance of deliberation procedures 
(James 2012, p. 60; Lenman 2012, p. 215). We can thus 
formulate these views with the following schema:
Constructivism about Reasons: Information about 
the outcomes of the deliberation procedure R makes 
claims about reasons superassertible.
Constructivists then disagree about R. According to a sim-
ple Humean view, information about whether a statement 
about a reason seems true from the agent’s own deliberative 
perspective is sufficient to make the statement superasserti-
ble (Street 2008). Humeans can also rely on information 
about more idealized deliberation procedures: they could 
claim that information about what a fully rational version 
of A would want A to do in C makes the relevant sentences 
about A’s reasons superassertible.8
Another, Sidgwickian alternative would be to argue that 
one can subject an intellectual seeming about a reason to 
critical reflection in which one must pursue conceptual and 
factual clarity, stability in reflection, internal coherence 
and interpersonal agreement (Sidgwick 1884, pp. 339–342; 
Scanlon 1998, pp. 65–69). Information about candidate 
reasons surviving these stages of critical reflection could 
then be claimed to make the relevant sentences about rea-
sons superassertible.
Similarly, Kantians could argue that information about 
whether A could consistently universalise her maxim of 
action makes the relevant sentences about A’s reasons 
superassertible.9 Aristotelians, in contrast, would be give 
even more substantive descriptions of R. They could argue 
that sentences about reasons are made superassertible by 
information about the practical judgments of a wise person 
or by information about the outcomes of good dispositions 
of practical thought (Setiya 2007; Tiberius 2012).
6  An Argumentative Strategy
Constructivists and realists about reasons disagree about 
which property realizes the truth of the sentences about 
reasons. Constructivists claim that their is realized by 
superassertibility, whereas realists claim that it is realized 
by correspondence to facts. Realists therefore claim that the 
satisfaction of the epistemic norms in the reasons-discourse 
8 This proposal is influenced by Smith (1994, Ch. 5).
9 This is influenced by Korsgaard (1996, pp. 97–98). For a critical 
examination, see Scanlon (2012, p. 237).
only at best tracks the reason-relations. These views 
thereby also disagree about the modal status of the con-
nection between the satisfaction of the relevant epistemic 
norms and the reasons-facts (Wright 1992, p. 112; James 
2012, pp. 61–65). According to constructivism, because the 
superassertibility of the reasons-sentences constitutes their 
truth, necessarily, if a sentence about an agent’s reason is 
superassertible, it is fact that the agent in question has that 
reason. In contrasts, realists must accept that it is possible 
that a sentence satisfies the relevant epistemic norms and 
yet the corresponding fact about reasons fails to obtain. 
We can therefore decide which of these views is correct 
by considering which one of these modal relations is more 
plausible.
There are Moorean facts about reasons (Dworkin 1996; 
James 2012, p. 63; Nagel 1997). In 2012, a 23-year-old 
female was raped by six men in South Delhi. The victim 
sadly died from her injuries two weeks later. It is a Moorean 
fact about reasons that the six men had sufficient reason not 
to rape the victim. This is one of the ‘things we know better 
than we know the premises of any philosophical facts to the 
contrary’ (Lewis 1996, p. 549).10
The Moorean facts about reasons have a strong modal 
status (Schroeder 2007, p. 106). In a wide range of possible 
worlds closest to ours, it remains the case that the six men 
had sufficient reason not to rape the victim. In these worlds, 
rape still causes suffering, it violates sexual autonomy, it 
has other horrible consequences, and the rapists have all 
the same normative capacities. The attitudes people have 
in these worlds towards rape, their beliefs about rape, and 
the relevant social conventions can, however, differ in these 
worlds.
The constructivists about reasons face a dilemma when 
they attempt to accommodate the modally strong Moorean 
facts about reasons.11 They need to guarantee that there is a 
necessary connection between the satisfaction of the epis-
temic norms of the reasons-discourse and the relevant facts 
about reasons. The first way to secure this connection is to 
specify the epistemic norms in a way that is conceptually 
tied to antecedent facts about reasons (Wright 1992, p. 
112).
The constructivists can thus specify R so that it is 
impossible for the sentence ‘the six South Delhi men had 
no reason not to rape the victim’ to pass this procedure. 
10 Or, perhaps you will agree that we all have reasons to pursue 
‘pleasures of food, drink, sex, warmth, and ease’ and to avoid ‘future 
agony’ (Nagel 1986, pp. 156–162; Parfit 2011, vol. 1, pp. 73–82).
11 This problem is an adaptation of an objection to response-depend-
ence views (Wright 1988; Miller 2003, ch. 7). Against constructiv-
ism it has been discussed by Darwall et al. (1992, p. 142) and Ridge 
(2012, p. 140).
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The Sidgwickian proposal could, for example, state that the 
previous sentence could not be stable in reflection for those 
who understand its concepts. Here we assume the Moorean 
fact about reasons first and then define the epistemic norms 
so that the satisfaction of those norms guarantees the 
Moorean fact in the relevant worlds. This proposal, unfor-
tunately, collapses into realism (Wright 1992, p. 112). The 
epistemic norms of the reasons-discourse now conceptually 
depend on facts about reasons, and so they cannot play an 
explanatory role in the construction of the reasons.
This means that constructivists must formulate the epis-
temic norms of the reasons-discourse by relying only on 
concepts that don’t make a reference to substantial facts 
about reasons.12 The problem here is that there are situa-
tions in which a sentence about an agent’s reason satisfies 
the resulting independently specified epistemic norms but 
the truth of the sentence conflicts with the relevant 
Moorean facts about reasons (Wright 1988, pp. 23–24; 
Miller 2003, pp. 136; Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 42). The con-
structivists about reasons cannot thus vindicate the strong 
modal connection in this way either.
Consider the Smith-inspired constructivism about rea-
sons. We must now understand full rationality (being fully 
informed and having maximally coherent and unified 
desires) as a purely formal quality. As a result, there could 
be individuals whose advisors would have substantially dif-
ferent motivational sets even if they would all be equally 
fully rational. This type of formal maximal coherence and 
unifiedness would only require structural isomorphism 
between those sets. However, if the ideal advisors can have 
substantially different but equally rational sets of desires, 
then at least some of the fully rational advisors could have 
had no desire for the actual South Delhi men not to rape the 
23-year-old woman (Parfit 2011, vol. 1, pp. 72–82).13
If the constructivists formulate the epistemic norms of 
the reasons-discourse independently of substantial facts 
about reasons, there won’t thus be a strong modal connec-
tion between the satisfaction of the epistemic norms and 
the corresponding Moorean facts about reasons.14 As a 
result, these epistemic norms could at best imperfectly 
track the independent facts about reasons, which entails 
12 Street (2012, p. 40) explicitly accepts this horn of the dilemma.
13 Smith himself is optimistic that all advisors who satisfy the formal 
norms of rationality converge because it is constitutive of rationality 
to aim at arriving at a set of desires which all other rational agents 
share (Smith 1995, p. 118). For an objection, see Kelly and McGrath 
(2010).
14 In response, some constructivists would deny that there is a strong 
modal connection between the satisfaction of the epistemic norms 
and facts about reasons as the latter do co-vary with the satisfac-
tion of the epistemic norms. These constructivists (see Street 2012) 
openly admit the relativist consequences of their view.
realism. Simply put, the Moorean facts about reasons 
would fail to obtain in all the relevant worlds if the con-
structivist views about practical reasons were true. Yet, 
their obtaining doesn’t depend on whether certain state-
ments about these reasons happen to satisfy the indepen-
dently specified epistemic norms.
This section has described an argumentative strategy 
against constructivist views about reasons. We can always 
argue against such views by showing that they either (a) 
accommodate the strong modal status by relying on ante-
cedent facts about reasons or (b) they fail to accommodate 
the strong modal status of the Moorean facts. In contrast, 
non-naturalist realist views about reasons can arguably sup-
port the strong modal status of the Moorean facts about 
reasons (Parfit 2011, Vols. 1, 2, Chs. 2, 31). Recently also 
reductivist naturalists and expressivists have argued that 
their views too are compatible with the modally strong 
Moorean facts about reasons (Schroeder 2007, Ch. 6; Len-
man 2009).15
7  Constructivism About Wrongness 
and Contractualism
This section motivates the idea that we should be construc-
tivists about right and wrong even if we reject constructiv-
ism about reasons.16 If you are a non-naturalist, naturalist, 
or an expressivist about reasons, you could first think that 
claims about wrongness just are about reasons understood 
in your favoured non-constructivist way. Perhaps the claim 
that an act is wrong just means that there are decisive rea-
sons not to do it (Parfit 2011, vol. 1, p. 166). The main 
problem with this simple proposal is that it is not sufficient 
for an act to be morally wrong that there are decisive rea-
sons not to do it. I can have decisive reasons not to go out 
without an umbrella even if doing so isn’t morally wrong.
15 I agree with the constructivists that there is no formal distinction 
between moral and non-moral reasons and so I take the argument 
above to apply to moral reasons too. I assume that the reasons-rela-
tions in which moral reasons stand are identical to other reasons-
relations and so the argument above shows that we should not be 
constructivists about these reasons either. Certain reasons are called 
moral due to the nature of the considerations that are these reasons 
and the acts they favor, but it has never been made clear which rea-
sons are moral.
16 This combination resembles Street’s interpretation of Scan-
lon’s view (Street 2008, p. 217, see also Scanlon 1998, pp. 55–64). 
Ridge reaches a similar conclusion: because Korsgaard’s construc-
tivism cannot avoid the horns of the previous dilemma, her ethical 
theory must be supplemented with a traditional metaethical founda-
tion (Ridge 2012, pp. 142–143). For a combination of expressivism 
about reasons and constructivism about right and wrong, see Lenman 
(2012).
 J. Suikkanen 
1 3
In response, it could be claimed that claims about 
wrongness are about a whole set of reasons: about (i) strong 
reasons not to do an act, but also (ii) about strong reasons 
to accept moral principles that forbid doing it, and (iii) 
about reasons for having negative reactive attitudes towards 
its performance (Parfit 2011, vol. 1, pp. 65–66). The prob-
lem here is that all these reasons are not always necessary. 
There are cases in which an agent can act wrongly even if 
there are no reasons to blame her (Parfit 1984, pp. 33–34). 
It is hence difficult to specify a set of reasons that would 
be both necessary and sufficient for an act’s wrongness. 
Claims about wrongness cannot therefore be about reasons 
in a direct way.
The other alternative for the non-constructivists about 
reasons is to think that wrongness is a distinct property, 
both metaphysically and semantically independent of rea-
sons. One could then give one account of reasons and 
another of wrongness with one’s metaethical framework. 
The problem here is that there are inferential connections 
between wrongness and reasons. If we know that an act is 
wrong, we can expect that there are at least some reasons 
related to that act. We can expect that, by default, there are 
reasons not to do the act and to blame those who commit 
those acts. If some of these reasons are not present in a 
particular case, there is a special explanation for this. The 
problem is that, if reasons and wrongness are understood 
separately in non-naturalist, naturalist or expressivist way, 
then this type of inferential connections are difficult to 
explain.
The main advantage of constructivism about wrongness 
is that it can avoid the previous difficulty. It can explain the 
inferential connections between reasons and wrongness 
without reducing wrongness to reasons. According to this 
view, information about reasons makes claims about the 
wrongness superassertible and thus minimally true. The 
fact that the epistemic norms of the wrongness discourse 
are tied to information about reasons then explains why we 
can expect that reasons are related to wrong actions even if 
claims about wrongness are not about reasons (Sect. 3).
This view can be formulated in two stages. Firstly, we 
can begin from the idea that we are justified to claim that 
an act is wrong when we have enough information about 
the cluster of reasons (i)–(iii) that is related to the act. 
These reasons need not be overriding reasons and not all 
of them need to exist in a specific case just as long as a suf-
ficient number of them are present in each case. Informa-
tion about reasons can thus be argued to make claims about 
wrongness superassertible.
At the second stage, we can try to discover general infor-
mation about the previous type of clusters of reasons that 
are related to different acts. One could then claim that such 
more general information about reasons too makes wrong-
ness-sentences superassertible and as a result also 
minimally true. My suggestion is that, as an ethical theory, 
contractualism enables us to locate the previous informa-
tion about the relevant cluster of reasons for the purposes 
of the general constructivist view about wrongness.17 The 
relevant information turns out to be about personal reasons 
for rejecting moral principles.
At the core of contractualism is the idea that some acts 
are forbidden by the set of moral principles which no one 
could reasonably reject (Scanlon 1998, Chs. 4–5). Call this 
set ‘the contractualist principles’. There are many alterna-
tive sets of moral principles which we could internalize. 
For every such set, there is a world in other ways like the 
actual world in which that code has been internalised by an 
overwhelming majority.
Whichever moral code has been internalised in a world 
determines what kind of lives individuals come to live. 
Call these lives of the individuals their ‘standpoints’ (Scan-
lon 1998, pp. 202–206). Some qualities of the standpoints 
make them choiceworthy. These are the qualities of the 
standpoints which give us reasons to prefer to occupy them. 
Other qualities of the standpoints provide us with reasons 
for not wanting to occupy them. Call the latter qualities of 
the standpoints ‘burdens’ (Scanlon 1998, p. 195). As exam-
ples of such burdens, Scanlon lists bodily injury, not being 
able to rely on the assurances of others, not having control 
over what happens to oneself and not being able to pursue 
our own projects or to have family and friends (Scanlon 
1998, p. 204).
We can then stipulate that individuals whose stand-
points are burdensome can present their burdens as per-
sonal reasons for rejecting the principles under which they 
live (Scanlon 1998, p. 195). How strong such reasons are 
depends on the seriousness of the burdens. These personal 
reasons can be used for defining the reasonable rejectability 
of sets of moral principles. From a world in which certain 
principles have been internalised, we take the individual 
whose life is the most burdensome. This individual can 
reasonably reject the principles under which she lives if 
there is an alternative set that doesn’t create as burdensome 
standpoints to anyone in the world in which it has been 
adopted (Scanlon 1998, pp. 195–196).
As a consequence, there will be one set that no one can 
reasonably reject. It is such that under all other sets live 
some individuals whose lives are more burdensome than 
the lives of the people who live under it. The individuals 
who have to live such unnecessarily burdensome lives have 
stronger personal reasons for rejecting the principles under 
which they live than the individuals living under the non-
rejectable set have for rejecting their code. In this way, the 
17 Scanlon (2014, p. 96) has recently described his contractualism in 
this way.
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property of being forbidden by the contractualist principles 
is a function the personal reasons which different individu-
als have for rejecting the sets of principles.
8  Warranted Assertion
My proposal then is that information about which acts are 
forbidden by the contractualist principles makes sentences 
about wrongness superassertible. For this proposal to work, 
(i) the information about whether an act is forbidden by the 
contractualist principles needs to justify asserting sentences 
about the wrongness of acts, (ii) such information needs 
to be accessible, and (iii) it would also need to continue to 
justify claims about wrongness no matter how much further 
investigation we did. I will consider the reasons for accept-
ing (i) in this section and the reasons for accepting (ii) in 
the next one. (iii) is, of course, a matter of how the future 
investigation pans out.
As explained above, we are justified to assert that an act 
is wrong whenever we are aware of strong reasons not to do 
the act, to accept and follow principles that forbid it, and for 
having negative reactive attitudes towards the performance 
of the act. Does being forbidden by the contractualist prin-
ciples entail the existence of such a cluster of reasons?
Firstly, there are strong reasons not to do acts that are 
forbidden by the contractualist principles. By following 
these principles we can form relationships with others that 
enable us to recognise their ability to evaluate and to act 
on reasons (Scanlon 1998, p. 162). If we didn’t follow such 
principles, we would express our willingness to ignore 
the personal objections of others. Furthermore, we tend 
to be offended when we realise that others do not see us 
as someone to whom justification is owed. In contrast, if 
we are able to justify our actions on the basis of the con-
tractualist principles, we can stand by our actions (Pettit 
2000, p. 231). This relation to others constitutes a concrete 
good in our lives. We also have reasons not to do these acts 
because of the first-order burdens which they tend to cause 
to others.
Secondly, we have reasons to accept the contractual-
ist principles—to let them guide our moral deliberation. 
In the same way as merely conforming to these principles, 
accepting them too helps us to form valuable relationships 
with others. It expresses that we are concerned about their 
potential objections. The acceptance of the contractual-
ist principles also has further advantageous expectation 
effects. If we accept those principles, others are more likely 
to treat us in ways which they can justify to us on the basis 
of the contractualist principles (Lenman 2006, p. 12). This 
will create an atmosphere of trust which will support mutu-
ally beneficial co-operation.
We also have reasons for adopting reactive attitudes 
such as blame and resentment when we and others act in 
the ways that are forbidden by the contractualist principles. 
When someone fails to follow the contractualist principles, 
this expresses lack of respect for our rational capacities. 
This is because, if an agent violates those principles, she 
does not care about what kind of objections we might have 
to her actions. In such cases, the agent does not think that 
we deserve to be treated in the mutually justifiable ways, 
which is a way of denying us an equal moral status. By vio-
lating the contractualist principles, the agent thus reveals 
that she has attitudes towards us which impair the valuable 
moral relationship that existed between us (Scanlon 2008, 
pp. 140–141).
This is why we have reasons to blame those who fail 
follow the contractualist principles (Scanlon 2008, pp. 
166–179). Blame and resentment are reactions that enable 
us to distance ourselves from those who have impaired 
their relationship to us through their actions (Scanlon 2008, 
p. 141). Such reactions are a reasonable response to the fact 
that others have excluded us from the valuable moral rela-
tionships described above. We also have good reasons to 
blame others for the first-order burdens that we have to bear 
when the contractualist principles have been violated.
If the previous arguments work, then if an act is forbid-
den by the contractualist principles there are strong reasons 
not to do the act, to accept and follow principles that forbid 
it, and also for blaming and resenting others for doing that 
act. This entails that information about an act being forbid-
den by the contractualist principles justifies us to claim that 
the act is wrong.
9  Accessibility
In order for the previous information to make the relevant 
sentences about the wrongness of different acts superas-
sertible, this information would also have to be accessible. 
Firstly, we would need to be able to discover what kind of 
standpoints the adoption of different sets of moral princi-
ples creates for different individuals. Much of this informa-
tion can be acquired through thought-experiments. If the 
principles encouraged people to kill one other, presumably 
our lives would be shorter. Furthermore, we can acquire 
information about the consequences of different principles 
by observing different communities in which they have 
been adopted and we could also empirically test what con-
sequences different sets would have. The consequences of 
different sets of moral principles are thus knowable.
We would also need reliable information about how 
strong reasons different burdensome qualities of individual 
lives provide objecting to the principles that are responsi-
ble for them. Is it possible to compare the choiceworthiness 
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of different individual lives? Firstly, we often make choices 
that require evaluating the choiceworthiness of different 
lives. We have to choose which career to pursue and what 
kind of relationships to form. When we make these deci-
sions, we have little information about the future circum-
stance which will shape our lives, desires, and tastes. We 
cannot therefore ground our decisions on how many of our 
special tastes and desires will be satisfied, but rather we 
must assess in more general terms whether the new circum-
stances would enable us to pursue our projects, to form spe-
cial relationships, to have sufficient wealth, and so on. If we 
can compare our future lives on these general grounds, it 
must be possible also to compare the choiceworthiness of 
the possible lives which could be ours (Broome 2004, pp. 
94–95).
It could be objected that there are no good standards for 
evaluating the correctness of the previous judgments (Wal-
lace 2002, p. 432), but this objection is unduly sceptical. 
Not all judgments about reasons can be accepted as equally 
correct. We do recognise certain ‘standards for arriving at 
conclusions about reasons’ as better than others (Scanlon 
1998, p. 63). These standards are the same epistemic stand-
ards which we use to critically evaluate the credentials of 
our beliefs generally.
When we assess whether some intuitively plausible 
claim is true, we must consider whether we have clearly 
understood the concepts which compose the proposition 
which is expressed by that claim. We must also consider 
the epistemic origins of our initial intuition. Can the source 
of our intuition be found from undermining sources such 
as momentary emotions, distorting social factors or the 
like? In addition, we need to make sure that our intuition 
is stable under reflection and that it coheres with our other 
beliefs. Furthermore, we must consider whether other 
rational inquirers share our intuition (Sect. 5).
If we can in this way assess how strong objections dif-
ferent individuals can present to different sets of moral 
principles, then the information needed for considering 
which acts are forbidden by the contractualist principles 
is accessible. That information thus also satisfies the sec-
ond requirement for making the relevant wrongness-claims 
superassertible. And, given that we do not have good rea-
sons now to believe that this information would stop jus-
tifying assertions about wrongness in the future, we can 
conclude that information about being forbidden by the 
contractualist principles makes sentences about wrongness 
superassertible.
10  Conclusion
This means that we have all the required elements for a new 
restricted contractualist form of constructivism.18 We first 
need to understand reasons in a non-constructivist way. We 
can then think that information about reasons to reject dif-
ferent sets of principles makes claims about right and 
wrong superassertible. This allows us to argue that, by 
default, the truth of these claims is realized by their super-
assertibility, and therefore the property of wrongness is a 
projection from the minimally true statements about 
wrongness.19 This means that there is finally a distinct 
coherent constructivist metaethical proposal on the table.
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